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Two distinct research approaches have been proposed for assigning a purely extensional semantics
to higher-order logic programming. The former approach uses classical domain-theoretic tools while
the latter builds on a fixed-point construction defined on a syntactic instantiation of the source pro-
gram. The relationships between these two approaches had not been investigated until now. In
this paper we demonstrate that for a very broad class of programs, namely the class of definitional
programs introduced by W. W. Wadge, the two approaches coincide (with respect to ground atoms
that involve symbols of the program). On the other hand, we argue that if existential higher-order
variables are allowed to appear in the bodies of program rules, the two approaches are in general dif-
ferent. The results of the paper contribute to a better understanding of the semantics of higher-order
logic programming.
1 Introduction
Extensional higher-order logic programming has been proposed [10, 1, 2, 7, 5, 4] as a promising general-
ization of classical logic programming. The key idea behind this paradigm is that the predicates defined
in a program essentially denote sets and therefore one can use standard extensional set theory in order
to understand their meaning and reason about them. The main difference between the extensional and
the more traditional intensional approaches to higher-order logic programming [9, 6] is that the latter
approaches have a much richer syntax and expressive capabilities but a non-extensional semantics.
Actually, despite the fact that only very few articles have been written regarding extensionality in
higher-order logic programming, two main semantic approaches can be identified. The work described
in [10, 7, 5, 4] uses classical domain-theoretic tools in order to capture the meaning of higher-order logic
programs. On the other hand, the work presented in [1, 2] builds on a fixed-point construction defined on
a syntactic instantiation of the source program in order to achieve an extensional semantics. Until now,
the relationships between the above two approaches had not yet been investigated.
In this paper we demonstrate that for a very broad class of programs, namely the class of definitional
programs introduced by W. W. Wadge [10], the two approaches coincide. Intuitively, this means that
for any given definitional program, the sets of true ground atoms of the program are identical under the
two different semantic approaches. This result is interesting since it suggests that definitional programs
are of fundamental importance for the further study of extensional higher-order logic programming. On
the other hand, we argue that if we try to slightly extend the source language, the two approaches give
different results in general. Overall, the results of the paper contribute to a better understanding of the
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semantics of higher-order logic programming and pave the road for designing a realistic extensional
higher-order logic programming language.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces extensional higher-order
logic programming and presents in an intuitive way the two existing approaches for assigning meaning
to programs of this paradigm. Section 3 contains background material, namely the syntax of definitional
programs and the formal details behind the two aforementioned semantic approaches. Section 4 demon-
strates the equivalence of the two semantics for definitional programs. Finally, Section 5 concludes the
paper with discussion regarding non-definitional programs and with pointers to future work.
2 Intuitive Overview of the two Extensional Approaches
In this section we introduce extensional higher-order logic programming and present the two existing
approaches for assigning meaning to programs of this paradigm. Since these two proposals were initially
introduced by W. W. Wadge and M. Bezem respectively, we will refer to them as Wadge’s semantics
and Bezem’s semantics respectively. The key idea behind both approaches is that in order to achieve
an extensional semantics, one has to consider a fragment of higher-order logic programming that has a
restricted syntax.
2.1 Extensional Higher-Order Logic Programming
The main differences between extensional and intensional higher-order logic programming can be easily
understood through two simple examples (borrowed from [5]). Due to space limitations, we avoid a more
extensive discussion of this issue; the interested reader can consult [5].
Example 1. Suppose we have a database of professions, both of their membership and their status. We
might have rules such as:
engineer(tom).
engineer(sally).
programmer(harry).
with engineer and programmer used as predicates. In intensional higher-order logic programming we
could also have rules in which these are arguments, eg:
profession(engineer).
profession(programmer).
Now suppose tom and sally are also avid users of Twitter. We could have rules:
tweeter(tom).
tweeter(sally).
The predicates tweeter and engineer are equal as sets (since they are true for the same objects,
namely tom and sally). If we attempted to understand the above program from an extensional point
of view, then we would have to accept that profession(tweeter) must also hold (since tweeter and
engineer are indistinguishable as sets). It is clear that the extensional interpretation in this case is com-
pletely unnatural. The program can however be understood intensionally: the predicate profession is
true of the name engineer (which is different than the name tweeter).
On the other hand, there are cases where predicates can be understood extensionally:
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Example 2. Consider a program that consists only of the following rule:
p(Q):-Q(0),Q(1).
In an extensional language, predicate p above can be intuitively understood in purely set-theoretic terms:
p is the set of all those sets that contain both 0 and 1.
It should be noted that the above program is also a syntactically acceptable program of the existing
intensional logic programming languages. The difference is that in an extensional language the above
program has a purely set-theoretic semantics.
From the above examples it can be understood that extensional higher-order logic programming
sacrifices some of the rich syntax of intensional higher-order logic programming in order to achieve
semantic clarity.
2.2 Wadge’s Semantics
The first proposal for an extensional semantics for higher-order logic programming was given in [10]
(and later refined and extended in [7, 5, 4]). The basic idea behind Wadge’s approach is that if we
consider a properly restricted higher-order logic programming language, then we can use standard ideas
from denotational semantics in order to assign an extensional meaning to programs. The basic syntactic
assumptions introduced by Wadge in [10] are the following:
• In the head of every rule in a program, each argument of predicate type must be a variable; all such
variables must be distinct.
• The only variables of predicate type that can appear in the body of a rule, are variables that appear
in its head.
Programs that satisfy the above restrictions are named definitional in [10].
Example 3. The program1:
p(a).
q(b).
r(P,Q):-P(a),Q(b).
is definitional because the arguments of predicate type in the head of the rule for r are distinct variables.
Moreover, the only predicate variables that appear in the body of the same rule, are the variables in its
head (namely P and Q).
Example 4. The program:
q(a).
r(q).
is not definitional because the predicate constant q appears as an argument in the second clause. For a
similar reason, the program in Example 1 is not definitional. The program:
p(Q,Q):-Q(a).
is also not definitional because the predicate variable Q is used twice in the head of the above rule. Finally,
the program:
p(a):-Q(a).
is not definitional because the predicate variable Q that appears in the body of the above rule, does not
appear in the head of the rule.
1For simplicity reasons, the syntax that we use in our example programs is Prolog-like. The syntax that we adopt in the next
section is slightly different and more convenient for the theoretical developments that follow.
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As it is argued in [10], if a program satisfies the above two syntactic restrictions, then it has a unique
minimum model (this notion will be precisely defined in Section 3). Consider again the program of
Example 3. In the minimum model of this program, the meaning of predicate p is the relation {a}
and the meaning of predicate q is the relation {b}. On the other hand, the meaning of predicate r
in the minimum model is a relation that contains the pairs ({a},{b}), ({a,b},{b}), ({a},{a,b}) and
({a,b},{a,b}). As remarked by W. W. Wadge (and formally demonstrated in [7, 5]), the minimum
model of every definitional program is monotonic and continuous2 . Intuitively, monotonicity means that
if in the minimum model the meaning of a predicate is true of a relation, then it is also true of every
superset of this relation. For example, we see that since the meaning of r is true of ({a},{b}), then it is
also true of ({a,b},{b}) (because {a,b} is a superset of {a}).
The minimum model of a given definitional program can be constructed as the least fixed-point of an
operator that is associated with the program, called the immediate consequence operator of the program.
As it is demonstrated in [10, 7], the immediate consequence operator is monotonic, and this guarantees
the existence of the least fixed-point which is constructed by a bottom-up iterative procedure (more
formal details will be given in the next section).
Example 5. Consider the definitional program:
q(a).
q(b).
p(Q):-Q(a).
id(R)(X):-R(X).
In the minimum model of the above program, the meaning of q is the relation {a,b}. The meaning of p is
the set of all relations that contain (at least) a; more formally, it is the relation {r | a∈ r}. The meaning of
id is the set of all pairs (r,d) such that d belongs to r; more formally, it is the relation {(r,d) | d ∈ r}.
Notice that in the construction of the minimum model, all predicates are initially assigned the empty
relation. The rules of the program are then used in order to improve the meaning assigned to each
predicate symbol. More specifically, at each step of the fixed-point computation, the meaning of each
predicate symbol either stabilizes or it becomes richer than the previous step.
Example 6. Consider again the definitional program of the previous example. In the iterative construc-
tion of the minimum model, all predicates are initially assigned the empty relation (of the corresponding
type). After the first step of the construction, the meaning assigned to predicate q is the relation {a,b}
due to the first two facts of the program. At this same step, the meaning of p becomes the relation
{r | a ∈ r}. Also, the meaning of id becomes equal to the relation {(r,d) | d ∈ r}. Additional itera-
tions will not alter the relations we have obtained at the first step; in other words, we have reached the
fixed-point of the bottom-up computation.
In the above example, we obtained the meaning of the program in just one step. If the source program
contained recursive definitions, convergence to the least fixed-point would in general require more steps.
2.3 Bezem’s Semantics
In [1, 2], M. Bezem proposed an alternative extensional semantics for higher-order logic programs.
Again, the syntax of the source language has to be appropriately restricted. Actually, the class of pro-
grams adopted in [1, 2] is a proper superset of the class of definitional programs. In particular, Bezem
proposes the class of hoapata programs which extend definitional programs:
2The notion of continuity will not play any role in the remaining part of this paper.
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• A predicate variable that appears in the body of a rule, need not necessarily appear in the head of
that rule.
• The head of a rule can be an atom that starts with a predicate variable.
Example 7. All definitional programs of the previous subsection are also hoapata. The following non-
definitional program of Example 4 is hoapata:
p(a):-Q(a).
Intuitively, the above program states that p is true of a if there exists a predicate that is defined in the
program that is true of a. We will use this program in our discussion at the end of the paper.
The following program is also hoapata (but not definitional):
P(a,b).
Intuitively, the above program states that every binary relation is true of the pair (a,b).
Given a hoapata program, the starting idea behind Bezem’s approach is to take its “ground instantia-
tion” in which we replace variables with well-typed terms of the Herbrand Universe of the program (ie.,
terms that can be created using only predicate and individual constants that appear in the program). For
example, given the program:
q(a).
q(b).
p(Q):-Q(a).
id(R)(X):-R(X).
the ground instantiation is the following infinite “program”:
q(a).
q(b).
p(q):-q(a).
id(q)(a):-q(a).
p(id(q)):-id(q)(a).
id(id(q))(a):-id(q)(a).
p(id(id(q))):-id(id(q))(a).
· · ·
One can now treat the new program as an infinite propositional one (ie., each ground atom can be seen as
a propositional one). This implies that we can use the standard least fixed-point construction of classical
logic programming (see for example [8]) in order to compute the set of atoms that should be taken as
“true”. In our example, the least fixed-point will contain atoms such as q(a), q(b), p(q), id(q)(a),
p(id(q)), and so on.
A main contribution of Bezem’s work was that he established that the least fixed-point of the ground
instantiation of every hoapata program is extensional. This notion can intuitively be explained as follows.
It is obvious in the above example that the relations q and id(q) are equal (they are both true of only
the constant a, and therefore they both correspond to the relation {a}). Therefore, we would expect that
(for example) if p(q) is true then p(id(q)) is also true because q and id(q) should be considered as
interchangeable. This property of “interchangeability” is formally defined in [1, 2] and it is demonstrated
that it holds in the least fixed-point of the immediate consequence operator of the ground instance of every
hoapata program.
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2.4 The Differences Between the two Approaches
It is not hard to see that the two semantic approaches outlined in the previous subsections, have some
important differences. First, they operate on different source languages. Therefore, in order to compare
them we have to restrict Bezem’s approach to the class of definitional programs3.
The main difference however between the two approaches is the way that the least fixed-point of the
immediate consequence operator is constructed in each case. In Wadge’s semantics the construction starts
by initially assigning to every predicate constant the empty relation; these relations are then improved
at each step until they converge to their final meaning. In other words, Wadge’s semantics manipulates
relations. On the other hand, Bezem’s semantics works with the ground instantiation of the source
program and, at first sight, it appears to have a more syntactic flavor. In our running example, Wadge’s
approach converges in a single step while Bezem’s approach takes an infinite number of steps in order
to converge. However, one can easily verify that the ground atoms that belong to the least fixed-point
under Bezem’s semantics, are also true in the minimum model under Wadge’s semantics. This poses the
question whether under both approaches, the sets of ground atoms that are true, are identical. This is the
question that we answer positively in the rest of the paper.
3 Definitional Programs and their Semantics
In this section we define the source language H of definitional higher-order logic programs. Moreover,
we present in a formal way the two different extensional semantics that have been proposed for such
programs, namely Wadge’s and Bezem’s semantics respectively.
3.1 Syntax
The language H is based on a simple type system that supports two base types: o, the boolean domain,
and ι , the domain of individuals (data objects). The composite types are partitioned into three classes:
functional (assigned to function symbols), predicate (assigned to predicate symbols) and argument (as-
signed to parameters of predicates).
Definition 1. A type can either be functional, argument, or predicate, denoted by σ , ρ and pi respectively
and defined as:
σ := ι | (ι → σ)
pi := o | (ρ → pi)
ρ := ι | pi
We will use τ to denote an arbitrary type (either functional, argument or predicate one). As usual,
the binary operator → is right-associative. A functional type that is different than ι will often be written
in the form ιn → ι , n ≥ 1. Moreover, it can be easily seen that every predicate type pi can be written in
the form ρ1 → ··· → ρn → o, n≥ 0 (for n = 0 we assume that pi = o).
We proceed by defining the syntax of H :
Definition 2. The alphabet of the higher-order language H consists of the following:
1. Predicate variables of every predicate type pi (denoted by capital letters such as P,Q,R, . . .).
3Actually, we could alternatively extend Wadge’s approach to a broader class of programs. Such an extension has already
been performed in [5], and we will discuss its repercussions in the concluding section.
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2. Individual variables of type ι (denoted by capital letters such as X,Y,Z, . . .).
3. Predicate constants of every predicate type pi (denoted by lowercase letters such as p,q, r, . . .).
4. Individual constants of type ι (denoted by lowercase letters such as a,b,c, . . .).
5. Function symbols of every functional type σ 6= ι (denoted by lowercase letters such as f,g,h, . . .).
6. The logical conjunction constant ∧, the inverse implication constant ←, the left and right paren-
theses, and the equality constant ≈ for comparing terms of type ι .
The set consisting of the predicate variables and the individual variables of H will be called the
set of argument variables of H . Argument variables will be usually denoted by V and its subscripted
versions.
Definition 3. The set of terms of the higher-order language H is defined as follows:
• Every predicate variable (respectively predicate constant) of type pi is a term of type pi; every
individual variable (respectively individual constant) of type ι is a term of type ι ;
• if f is an n-ary function symbol and E1, . . . ,En are terms of type ι then (f E1 · · ·En) is a term of
type ι ;
• if E1 is a term of type ρ → pi and E2 a term of type ρ then (E1 E2) is a term of type pi .
Definition 4. The set of expressions of the higher-order language H is defined as follows:
• A term of type ρ is an expression of type ρ ;
• if E1 and E2 are terms of type ι , then (E1 ≈ E2) is an expression of type o.
We write vars(E) to denote the set of all the variables in E. Expressions (respectively terms) that have
no variables will often be referred to as ground expressions (respectively ground terms). Expressions of
type o will often be referred to as atoms. We will omit parentheses when no confusion arises. To denote
that an expression E has type ρ we will often write E : ρ .
Definition 5. A clause is a formula p V1 · · ·Vn ←E1∧·· ·∧Em, where p is a predicate constant, p V1 · · ·Vn
is a term of type o and E1, . . . ,Em are expressions of type o. The term p V1 · · ·Vn is called the head of the
clause, the variables V1, . . . ,Vn are the formal parameters of the clause and the conjunction E1∧·· ·∧Em
is its body. A definitional clause is a clause that additionally satisfies the following two restrictions:
1. All the formal parameters are distinct variables (ie., for all i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, Vi 6= V j).
2. The only variables that can appear in the body of the clause are its formal parameters and possibly
some additional individual variables (namely variables of type ι).
A program P is a set of definitional program clauses.
In the rest of the paper, when we refer to “clauses” we will mean definitional ones. For simplicity, we
will follow the usual logic programming convention and we will write p V1 · · ·Vn ← E1, . . . ,Em instead
of p V1 · · ·Vn ← E1∧ ·· ·∧Em.
Our syntax differs slightly from the Prolog-like syntax that we have used in Section 2. However, one
can easily verify that we can transform every program from the former syntax to the latter.
Definition 6. For a program P, we define the Herbrand universe for every argument type ρ , denoted
by UP,ρ to be the set of all ground terms of type ρ , that can be formed out of the individual constants,
function symbols and predicate constants in the program.
In the following, we will often talk about the “ground instantiation of a program”. This notion is
formally defined below.
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Definition 7. A ground substitution θ is a finite set of the form {V1/E1, . . . ,Vn/En} where the Vi’s
are different argument variables and each Ei is a ground term having the same type as Vi. We write
dom(θ) = {V1, . . . ,Vn} to denote the domain of θ .
We can now define the application of a substitution to an expression.
Definition 8. Let θ be a substitution and E be an expression. Then, Eθ is an expression obtained from E
as follows:
• Eθ = E if E is a predicate or individual constant;
• Vθ = θ(V) if V ∈ dom(θ); otherwise, Vθ = V;
• (f E1 · · ·En)θ = (f E1θ · · ·Enθ);
• (E1 E2)θ = (E1θ E2θ);
• (E1 ≈ E2)θ = (E1θ ≈ E2θ).
Definition 9. Let E be an expression and θ be a ground substitution such that vars(E) ⊆ dom(θ).
Then, the ground expression Eθ is called a ground instantiation of E. A ground instantiation of a
clause p V1 · · ·Vn ← E1, . . . ,Em with respect to a ground substitution θ is the formula (p V1 · · ·Vn)θ ←
E1θ , . . . ,Emθ . The ground instantiation of a program P is the (possibly infinite) set that contains all the
ground instantiations of the clauses of P with respect to all possible ground substitutions.
3.2 Wadge’s Semantics
The key idea behind Wadge’s semantics is (intuitively) to assign to program predicates monotonic re-
lations. In the following, given posets A and B, we write [A m→ B] to denote the set of all monotonic
relations from A to B.
Before specifying the semantics of expressions of H we need to provide the set-theoretic meaning
of the types of expressions of H with respect to an underlying domain. It is customary in logic pro-
gramming to take the underlying domain to be the Herbrand universe UP,ι . In the following definition
we define simultaneously and recursively two things: the semantics JτK of a type τ and a corresponding
partial order ⊑τ on the elements of JτK. We adopt the usual ordering of the truth values false and true,
i.e. false ≤ false, true ≤ true and false ≤ true.
Definition 10. Let P be a program. Then,
• JιK=UP,ι and ⊑ι is the trivial partial order that relates every element to itself;
• Jιn → ιK =Un
P,ι →UP,ι . A partial order for this case is not needed;
• JoK = {false, true} and ⊑o is the partial order ≤ on truth values;
• Jρ → piK = [JρK m→ JpiK] and ⊑ρ→pi is the partial order defined as follows: for all f ,g ∈ Jρ → piK,
f ⊑ρ→pi g iff f (d)⊑pi g(d) for all d ∈ JρK.
We now proceed to define Herbrand interpretations and states.
Definition 11. A Herbrand interpretation I of a program P is an interpretation such that:
1. for every individual constant c that appears in P, I(c) = c;
2. for every predicate constant p : pi that appears in P, I(p) ∈ JpiK;
3. for every n-ary function symbol f that appears in P and for all t1, . . . tn ∈ UP,ι , I(f) t1 · · ·tn =
f t1 · · · tn.
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Definition 12. A Herbrand state s of a program P is a function that assigns to each argument variable V
of type ρ , an element s(V) ∈ JρK.
In the following, s[V/d] is used to denote a state that is identical to s the only difference being that
the new state assigns to V the value d.
Definition 13. Let P be a program, I be a Herbrand interpretation of P and s be a Herbrand state. Then,
the semantics of the expressions of P is defined as follows:
1. JVKs(I) = s(V) if V is a variable;
2. JcKs(I) = I(c) if c is an individual constant;
3. JpKs(I) = I(p) if p is a predicate constant;
4. J(f E1 · · ·En)Ks(I) = I(f) JE1Ks(I) · · ·JEnKs(I);
5. J(E1 E2)Ks(I) = JE1Ks(I) JE2Ks(I);
6. J(E1 ≈ E2)Ks(I) = true if JE1Ks(I) = JE2Ks(I) and false otherwise.
For ground expressions E we will often write JEK(I) instead of JEKs(I) since the meaning of E is
independent of s.
It is straightforward to confirm that the above definition assigns to every expression an element of
the corresponding semantic domain, as stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let P be a program and let E : ρ be an expression. Also, let I be a Herbrand interpretation
and s be a Herbrand state. Then JEKs(I) ∈ JρK.
Definition 14. Let P be a program and M be a Herbrand interpretation of P. Then, M is a Herbrand
model of P iff for every clause p V1 · · ·Vn ← E1, . . .Em in P and for every Herbrand state s, if for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, JEiKs(M) = true then Jp V1 · · ·VnKs(M) = true.
In the following we denote the set of Herbrand interpretations of a program P with IP. We define a
partial order on IP as follows: for all I,J ∈IP, I ⊑IP J iff for every predicate p : pi that appears in P,
I(p) ⊑pi J(p). Similarly, we denote the set of Herbrand states with SP and we define a partial order as
follows: for all s1,s2 ∈SP, s1 ⊑SP s2 iff for all variables V : ρ , s1(V)⊑ρ s2(V). The following lemmata
are straightforward to establish:
Lemma 2. Let P be a program. Then, (IP,⊑IP) is a complete lattice.
Lemma 3. Let P be a program and let E : ρ be an expression. Let I,J be Herbrand interpretations and
s,s′ be Herbrand states. Then,
1. If I ⊑IP J then JEKs(I)⊑ρ JEKs(J).
2. If s⊑SP s′ then JEKs(I)⊑ρ JEKs′(I).
We can now define the immediate consequence operator for H programs, which generalizes the
corresponding operator for classical (first-order) programs [8].
Definition 15. Let P be a program. The mapping TP : IP → IP is called the immediate consequence
operator for P and is defined for every predicate p : ρ1 → ··· → ρn → o and di ∈ JρiK as
TP(I)(p) d1 · · ·dn =


true there exists a clause p V1 · · ·Vn ← E1, . . .Em such that
for every state s, JEiKs[V1/d1,...,Vn/dn](I) = true for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
false otherwise.
It is not hard to see that TP is a monotonic function, and this leads to the following theorem [10, 7]:
Theorem 1. Let P be a program. Then MP = lfp(TP) is the minimum, with respect to ⊑IP , Herbrand
model of P.
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3.3 Bezem’s Semantics
In contrast to Wadge’s semantics which proceeds by constructing the meaning of predicates as relations,
Bezem’s approach takes a (seemingly) more syntax-oriented approach. In particular, Bezem’s approach
builds on the ground instantiation of the source program in order to retrieve the meaning of the program.
In our definitions below, we follow relatively closely the exposition given in [1, 2, 3].
Definition 16. Let P be a program and let Gr(P) be its ground instantiation. An interpretation I for
Gr(P) is defined as a subset of UP,o by the usual convention that, for any A ∈UP,o, I(A) = true iff A ∈ I.
We also extend the interpretation I for every (E1 ≈ E2) atom as follows: I(E1 ≈ E2) = true if E1 = E2
and false otherwise.
Observe that the meaning of (E1 ≈ E2) is fixed and independent of the interpretation.
Definition 17. We define the immediate consequence operator, TGr(P), of P as follows:
TGr(P)(I)(A) =


true if there exists a clause A← E1, . . . ,Em in Gr(P)
such that I(Ei) = true for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
false otherwise.
As it is well established in bibliography (for example [8]), the least fixed-point of the immediate
consequence operator of a propositional program exists and is the minimum, with respect to set inclusion
and equivalently ≤, model of Gr(P). This fixed-point, which we will henceforth denote by MGr(P), is
shown in [1, 2] to be directly related to a notion of a model capable of capturing the perceived semantics
of the higher-order program P. In particular, this model by definition assigns to all ground atoms the
same truth values as MGr(P). It is therefore justified that we restrict our attention to MGr(P), instead of
the aforementioned higher-order model, in our attempt to prove the equivalence of Bezem’s semantics
and Wadge’s semantics.
The following definition and subsequent theorem obtained in [3], identify a property of MGr(P) that
we will need in the next section.
Definition 18. Let P be a program and let MGr(P) be the ≤-minimum model of Gr(P). For every
argument type ρ we define a corresponding partial order as follows: for type ι , we defineι as syntactical
equality, i.e. E ι E for all E ∈UP,ι . For type o, E o E′ iff MGr(P)(E) ≤ MGr(P)(E′). For a predicate
type of the form ρ → pi , Eρ→pi E′ iff EDpi E′D for all D ∈UP,ρ .
Theorem 2 (-Monotonicity Property). [3] Let P be a program and MGr(P) be the ≤-minimum model
of Gr(P). Then for all E ∈UP,ρ→pi and all D,D′ ∈UP,ρ such that Dρ D′, it holds ED pi ED′.
4 Equivalence of the two Semantics
In this section we demonstrate that the two semantics presented in the previous section, are equivalent for
definitional programs. To help us transcend the differences between these approaches, we introduce two
key notions, namely that of the ground restriction of a higher-order interpretation and its complementary
notion of the semantic extension of ground expressions. But first we present the following Substitution
Lemma, which will be useful in the proofs of later results.
Lemma 4 (Substitution Lemma). Let P be a program and I be a Herbrand interpretation of P. Also let
E be an expression and θ be a ground substitution with vars(E) ⊆ dom(θ). If s is a Herbrand state such
that, for all V ∈ vars(E), s(V) = Jθ(V)K(I), then JEKs(I) = JEθK(I).
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Proof. By a structural induction on E. For the basis case, if E= p or E= c then the statement reduces to
an identity and if E=V then it holds by assumption. For the induction step, we first examine the case that
E = (f E1 · · · En); then JEKs(I) = I(f) JE1Ks(I) · · · JEnKs(I) and JEθK(I) = I(f) JE1θK(I) · · · JEnθK(I).
By the induction hypothesis, JE1Ks(I) = JE1θK(I), . . . ,JEnKs(I) = JEnθK(I), thus we have JEKs(I) =
JEθK(I). Now consider the case that E = E1E2. We have JEKs(I) = JE1Ks(I)JE2Ks(I) and JEθK(I) =
JE1θK(I)JE2θK(I). Again, applying the induction hypothesis, we conclude that JEKs(I) = JEθK(I). Fi-
nally, if E = (E1 ≈ E2) we have that JEKs(I) = true iff JE1Ks(I) = JE2Ks(I), which, by the induction
hypothesis, holds iff JE1θK(I) = JE2θK(I). Moreover, we have JEθK(I) = true iff JE1θK(I) = JE2θK(I),
therefore we conclude that JEKs(I) = true iff JEθK(I) = true.
Given a Herbrand interpretation I of a definitional program, it is straightforward to devise a corre-
sponding interpretation of the ground instantiation of the program, by restricting I to only assigning truth
values to ground atoms. As expected, such a restriction of a model of the program produces a model of
its ground instantiation. This idea is formalized in the following definition and theorem.
Definition 19. Let P be a program, I be a Herbrand interpretation of P and Gr(P) be the ground instan-
tiation of P. We define the ground restriction of I, which we denote by I|Gr(P), to be an interpretation of
Gr(P), such that, for every ground atom A, I|Gr(P)(A) = JAK(I).
Theorem 3. Let P be a program and Gr(P) be its ground instantiation. Also let M be a Herbrand model
of P and M|Gr(P) be the ground restriction of M. Then M|Gr(P) is a model of Gr(P).
Proof. By definition, each clause in Gr(P) is of the form pE1 · · · En ← B1θ , . . . ,Bkθ , i.e. the ground
instantiation of a clause pV1 · · · Vn ← B1, . . . ,Bk in P with respect to a ground substitution θ , such
that dom(θ) includes V1, . . . ,Vn and all other (individual) variables appearing in the body of the clause
and θ(Vi) = Ei, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Let s be a Herbrand state such that s(V) = Jθ(V)K(M), for all
V ∈ dom(θ). By the Substitution Lemma (Lemma 4) and the definition of M|Gr(P), JpV1 · · · VnKs(M) =
JpE1 · · · EnK(M) = M|Gr(P)(pE1 · · · En). Similarly, for each atom Bi in the body of the clause, we
have JBiKs(M) = JBiθK(M) = M|Gr(P)(Biθ),1 ≤ i ≤ k. Consequently, if M|Gr(P)(Biθ) = true for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, we also have that JBiKs(M) = true,1 ≤ i ≤ k. As M is a model of P, this implies that
JpV1 · · · VnKs(M) = M|Gr(P)(pE1 · · · En) = true and therefore M|Gr(P) is a model of Gr(P).
The above theorem is of course useful in connecting the⊑IP-minimum Herbrand model of a program
to its ground instantiation. However, in order to prove the equivalence of the two semantics under
consideration, we will also need to go in the opposite direction and connect the ≤-minimum model of
the ground program to the higher-order program. To this end we introduce the previously mentioned
semantic extensions of a ground expression.
Definition 20. Let P be a program and MGr(P) be the ≤-minimum model of Gr(P). Let E be a ground
expression of argument type ρ and d be an element of JρK. We will say that d is a semantic extension of
E and write d✄ρ E if
• ρ = ι and d = E;
• ρ = o and d = MGr(P)(E);
• ρ = ρ ′→ pi and for all d′ ∈ Jρ ′K and E′ ∈UP,ρ ′ , such that d′✄ρ ′ E′, it holds that d d′✄pi EE′.
Compared to that of the ground restriction presented earlier, the notion of extending a syntactic
object to the realm of semantic elements, is more complicated. In fact, even the existence of a semantic
extension is not immediately obvious. The next lemma guarantees that not only can such an extension
A. Charalambidis, P. Rondogiannis & I. Symeonidou 29
be constructed for any expression of the language, but it also has an interesting property of mirroring
the ordering of semantic objects with respect to ⊑τ in a corresponding ordering of the expressions with
respect to τ .
Lemma 5. Let P be a program, Gr(P) be its ground instantiation and MGr(P) be the ≤-minimum model
of Gr(P). For every argument type ρ and every ground term E ∈UP,ρ
1. There exists e ∈ JρK such that e✄ρ E.
2. For all e,e′ ∈ JρK and all E′ ∈UP,ρ , if e✄ρ E, e′✄ρ E′ and e⊑ρ e′, then Eρ E′.
Proof. We prove both statements simultaneously, performing an induction on the structure of ρ . Specif-
ically, the first statement is proven by showing that in each case we can construct a function e of type ρ ,
which is monotonic with respect to ⊑ρ and satisfies e✄ρ E.
In the basis case, the construction of e for types ι and o is trivial. Also, if ρ = ι , then both ✄ρ
and ⊑ρ reduce to equality, so we have E = E′, which in this case is equivalent to E ρ E′. On the
other hand, for ρ = o, ✄ρ identifies with equality, while ⊑ρ and ρ identify with ≤, so we have that
MGr(P)(E) = e ≤ e
′ = MGr(P)(E
′) implies Eρ E′.
For a more complex type ρ = ρ1 → ··· → ρn → o, n > 0, we can easily construct e, as follows:
ee1 · · · en =


true, if there exist d1, . . . ,dn and ground terms D1, . . . ,Dn such that,
for all i,di ⊑ρi ei,di✄ρi Di and MGr(P)(ED1 · · · Dn) = true
false, otherwise.
To see that e is monotonic, consider e1, . . . ,en,e′1, . . . ,e′n, such that e1 ⊑ρ1 e′1, . . . ,en ⊑ρn e′n and observe
that ee1 · · · en = true implies ee′1 · · · e′n = true, due to the transitivity of ⊑ρi . We will now show that
e✄ρ E, i.e. for all e1, . . . ,en and E1, . . . ,En such that e1 ✄ρ1 E1, . . . ,en ✄ρn En, it holds ee1 · · · en =
MGr(P)(EE1 · · · En). This is trivial if MGr(P)(E E1 · · · En) = true, since ei ⊑ρi ei. Let us now examine the
case that MGr(P)(E E1 · · · En) = false. For the sake of contradiction, assume ee1 · · · en = true. Then, by
the construction of e, there must exist d1, . . . ,dn and D1, . . . ,Dn such that, for all i, di ⊑ρi ei, di✄ρi Di and
MGr(P)(ED1 · · · Dn) = true. By the induction hypothesis, we have that Di ρi Ei, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
This, by the -Monotonicity Property of MGr(P) (Theorem 2), yields that MGr(P)(ED1 · · · Dn) = true≤
MGr(P)(E E1 · · · En) = false, which is obviously a contradiction. Therefore it has to be that ee1 · · · en =
false.
Finally, in order to prove the second statement and conclude the induction step, we need to show
that for all terms D1 ∈ UP,ρ1 , . . . ,Dn ∈ UP,ρn , it holds E D1 · · · Dn o E′ D1 · · · Dn. By the induction
hypothesis, there exist d1, . . . ,dn, such that d1✄ρ1 D1, . . . ,dn✄ρn Dn. Because e✄ρ E and E D1 · · · Dn is
of type o, we have e d1 · · · dn =MGr(P)(E D1 · · · Dn) by definition. Similarly, we also have e′ d1 · · · dn =
MGr(P)(E
′ D1 · · · Dn). Moreover, by e ⊑ρ e′ we have that e d1 · · · dn ⊑o e′ d1 · · · dn. This yields the
desired result, since ⊑o identifies with o.
The following variation of the Substitution Lemma states that if the building elements of an expres-
sion are assigned meanings that are semantic extensions of their syntactic counterparts, then the meaning
of the expression is itself a semantic extension of the expression.
Lemma 6. Let P be a program, Gr(P) be its ground instantiation and I be a Herbrand interpretation of
P. Also, let E be an expression of some argument type ρ and let s be a Herbrand state and θ be a ground
substitution, both with domain vars(E). If, for all predicates p of type pi appearing in E, JpK(I)✄pi p and,
for all variables V of type ρ ′ in vars(E), s(V)✄ρ ′ θ(V), then JEKs(I)✄ρ Eθ .
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of E. The basis cases E = p and E = V hold by
assumption and E = c : ι is trivial. For the first case of the induction step, let E = (f E1 · · · En), where
E1, . . . ,En are of type ι . By the induction hypothesis, we have that JE1Ks(I)✄ι E1θ , . . . ,JEnKs(I)✄ι Enθ .
As ✄ι is defined as equality, we have that JEKs(I) = I(f) JE1Ks(I) · · · JEnKs(I) = f E1θ · · · Enθ = Eθ
and therefore JEKs(I)✄ι Eθ . For the second case, let E = E1E2, where E1 is of type ρ1 = ρ2 → pi and
E2 is of type ρ2; then, JEKs(I) = JE1Ks(I)JE2Ks(I). By the induction hypothesis, JE1Ks(I)✄ρ2→pi E1θ and
JE2Ks(I)✄ρ2 E2θ , thus, by definition, JEKs(I) = JE1Ks(I) JE2Ks(I)✄pi E1θ E2θ = (E1E2)θ = Eθ . Finally,
we have the case that E= (E1 ≈ E2), where E1 and E2 are both of type ι . The induction hypothesis yields
JE1Ks(I)✄ι E1θ and JE2Ks(I)✄ι E2θ or, since ✄ι is defined as equality, JE1Ks(I) = E1θ and JE2Ks(I) =
E2θ . Then JE1Ks(I) = JE2Ks(I) iff E1θ = E2θ and, equivalently, JEKs(I) = true iff Eθ = true, which
implies JEKs(I)✄o Eθ .
We are now ready to present the main result of this paper. The theorem establishes the equivalence
of Wadge’s semantics and Bezem’s semantics, in stating that their respective minimum models assign
the same meaning to all ground atoms.
Theorem 4. Let P be a program and let Gr(P) be its ground instantiation. Let MP be the ⊑IP-minimum
Herbrand model of P and let MGr(P) be the ≤-minimum model of Gr(P). Then, for every A ∈UP,o it
holds JAK(MP) = MGr(P)(A).
Proof. We will construct an interpretation N for P and prove some key properties for this interpretation.
Then we will utilize these properties to prove the desired result. The definition of N is as follows:
For every p : ρ1 → ··· → ρn → o and all d1 ∈ Jρ1K, . . . ,dn ∈ JρnK
N(p)d1 · · · dn =


false, if there exist e1, . . . ,en and ground terms E1, . . . ,En such that,
for all i,di ⊑ρi ei,ei✄ρi Ei and MGr(P)(pE1 · · · En) = false
true, otherwise
Observe that N is a valid Herbrand interpretation of P, in the sense that it assigns elements in JpiK (i.e.
functions that are monotonic with respect to⊑pi ) to every predicate of type pi in P. Indeed, if it was not so,
then for some predicate p : pi = ρ1 → ··· → ρn → o, there would exist tuples (d1, . . . ,dn) and (d′1, . . . ,d′n)
with d1 ⊑ρ1 d′1, . . . ,dn ⊑ρn d′n, such that N(p)d1 · · · dn = true and N(p)d′1 · · · d′n = false. By definition, the
fact that N(p)d′1 · · · d′n is assigned the value false, would imply that there exist e1, . . . ,en and E1, . . . ,En
as in the above definition, such that MGr(P)(pE1 · · · En) = false and d′1 ⊑ρ1 e1, . . . ,d′n ⊑ρn en. Being
that ⊑ρi are transitive relations, the latter yields that d1 ⊑ρ1 e1, . . . ,dn ⊑ρn en. Therefore, by definition,
N(p)d1 · · · dn should also evaluate to false, which constitutes a contradiction and thus confirms that the
meaning of p is monotonic with respect to ⊑pi .
It is also straightforward to see that N(p)✄pi p, i.e. for all d1, . . . ,dn and all ground terms D1, . . . ,Dn
such that d1✄ρ1 D1, . . . ,dn ✄ρn Dn, we have N(p)d1 · · · dn = MGr(P)(p D1 · · · Dn). Because di ⊑ρi di,
this holds trivially if MGr(P)(p D1 · · · Dn) = false. Now let MGr(P)(p D1 · · · Dn) = true and assume,
for the sake of contradiction, that N(p)d1 · · · dn = false. Then, by the definition of N, there must exist
e1, . . . ,en and E1, . . . ,En such that, for all i, di ⊑ρi ei, ei✄ρi Ei and MGr(P)(pE1 · · · En) = false. Thus,
by the second part of Lemma 5, for all i, Di ρi Ei and, by the -Monotonicity Property of MGr(P),
MGr(P)(pD1 · · · Dn) ≤MGr(P)(p E1 · · · En), which is obviously a contradiction. Thus we conclude that
N(p)d1 · · · dn = true.
Next we prove that N is a model of P. Let pV1 · · · Vn ← B1, . . . ,Bk be a clause in P and let
{V1, . . . ,Vn,X1, . . . ,Xm}, with Vi : ρi, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, and Xi : ι , for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, be the set of
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variables appearing in the clause. Then, it suffices to show that, for any tuple (d1, . . . ,dn) of arguments
and any Herbrand state s such that s(Vi) = di for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, N(p)d1 · · · dn = false implies that, for
at least one j ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, JB jKs(N) = false. Again, by the definition of N, we see that if N(p)d1 · · · dn =
false, then there exist e1, . . . ,en and ground terms E1, . . . ,En such that MGr(P)(pE1 · · · En) = false, d1 ⊑ρ1
e1, . . . ,dn ⊑ρn en and e1✄ρ1 E1, . . . ,dn✄ρn En. Let θ be a ground substitution such that θ(Vi) = Ei for
all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, θ(Xi) = s(Xi); then there exists a ground instantiation
pE1 · · · En ← B1θ , . . . ,Bkθ of the above clause in Gr(P). As MGr(P) is a model of the ground program,
MGr(P)(pE1 · · · En) = false implies that there exists at least one j ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that MGr(P)(B jθ) =
false. We are going to show that the latter implies that JB jKs(N) = false, which proves that N is a model
of P. Indeed, let s′ be a Herbrand state such that s′(Vi) = ei✄ρi θ(Vi) = Ei for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and
s′(Xi) = θ(Xi) = s(Xi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. As we have shown earlier, N(p′)✄pi ′ p′ for any predi-
cate p′ : pi ′, thus by Lemma 6 we get JB jKs′(N)✄o B jθ . Since B j is of type o, the latter reduces to
JB jKs′(N) = MGr(P)(B jθ) = false. Also, because di ⊑ρi ei, i.e. s⊑SP s′, by the second part of Lemma 3
we get JB jKs(N)⊑o JB jKs′(N), which makes JB jKs(N) = false.
Now we can proceed to prove that, for all A ∈UP,o, JAK(MP) = MGr(P)(A). Let A be of the form
p E1 · · · En, where p : ρ1 → ··· → ρn → o ∈ P and let d1 = JE1K(MP), . . . ,dn = JEnK(MP). As we have
shown, N is a Herbrand model of P, while MP is the minimum, with respect to ⊑IP , of all Herbrand
models of P, therefore we have that MP ⊑IP N. By definition, this gives us that MP(p) d1 · · · dn ⊑o
N(p) d1 · · · dn (1) and, by the first part of Lemma 3, that d1 ⊑ρ1 JE1K(N), . . . ,dn ⊑ρn JEnK(N) (2). More-
over, for all predicates p′ : pi ′ in P, we have N(p′)✄pi ′ p′ and thus, by Lemma 6, taking s and θ
to be empty, we get JEiK(N)✄ρi Ei,1 ≤ i ≤ n. In conjunction with (2), the latter suggests that if
MGr(P)(p E1 · · · En) = false then N(p) d1 · · · dn = false, or, in other words, that N(p) d1 · · · dn ≤
MGr(P)(p E1 · · · En). Because of (1), this makes it that MP(p) d1 · · · dn ≤ MGr(P)(p E1 · · · En) (3).
On the other hand, by Theorem 3, MP|Gr(P) is a model of Gr(P) and therefore MGr(P)(p E1 · · · En) ≤
MP|Gr(P)(p E1 · · · En), since MGr(P) is the minimum model of Gr(P). By the definition of Gr(P)
and the meaning of application, the latter becomes MGr(P)(p E1 · · · En) ≤ MP|Gr(P)(p E1 · · · En) =
MP(p E1 · · · En) = MP(p) JE1K(MP) · · · JEnK(MP) = MP(p) d1 · · · dn. The last relation and (3) can only
be true simultaneously, if all the above relations hold as equalities, in particular if MGr(P)(p E1 · · · En) =
Jp E1 · · · EnK(MP).
5 Discussion
We have considered the two existing extensional approaches to the semantics of higher-order logic pro-
gramming, and have demonstrated that they coincide for the class of definitional programs. It is therefore
natural to wonder whether the two semantic approaches continue to coincide if we extend the class of
programs we consider. Unfortunately this is not the case, as we discuss below.
A seemingly mild extension to our source language would be to allow higher-order predicate vari-
ables that are not formal parameters of a clause, to appear in its body. Such programs are legitimate under
Bezem’s semantics (ie., they belong to the hoapata class). Moreover, a recent extension of Wadge’s se-
mantics [5] also allows such programs. However, for this extended class of programs the equivalence of
the two semantic approaches no longer holds as the following example illustrates.
Example 8. Consider the following extended program:
p(a):-Q(a).
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Following Bezem’s semantics, we initially take the ground instantiation of the program, namely:
p(a):-p(a).
and then compute the least model of the above program which assigns to the atom p(a) the value false.
On the other hand, under the approach in [5], the atom p(a) has the value true in the minimum Herbrand
model of the initial program. This is due to the fact that under the semantics of [5], our initial program
reads (intuitively speaking) as follows: “p(a) is true if there exists a relation that is true of a”; actually,
there exists one such relation, namely the set {a}. This discrepancy between the two semantics is due to
the fact that Wadge’s semantics is based on sets and not solely on the syntactic entities that appear in the
program.
Future work includes the extension of Bezem’s approach to higher-order logic programs with nega-
tion. An extension of Wadge’s approach for such programs has recently been performed in [4]. More
generally, the addition of negation to higher-order logic programming appears to offer an interesting and
nontrivial area of research, which we are currently pursuing.
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